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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced by Plaintiffs-Respondents 
against various Defendants for collection of a promissory 
note, foreclosure of an equitable loan, and for damages 
arising from various violations of state securities law. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant Grant c. Mills failed to answer Plaintiffs' 
Complaint and a default judgment was taken against him in 
July of 1981. In December of 1981 he requested that the 
j~dgment be set aside. This motion was denied by the lower 
court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL BY RESPONDENTS 
Plaintiffs-Respondents seek aff irmance of the lower 
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court judgment and the order of the lower court declining 
to set aside the default judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The "Statement of Fact:S" submitted by Appellant fails 
to include several facts which are pertinent to this appeal. 
In addition, Appellant has distorted other facts in his own 
favor rather than correctly reciting the actual event as 
evidenced by the record. For these reasons, therefore, 
Respondents shall briefly restate the facts. 
On July 1, 1981 this action was initiated in a Complaint 
filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. 
Plaintiffs David Russell and Eileen Russell brought an 
action against numerous defendants based upon several theories 
of law including collection of a promissory note, foreclosure 
of an equitable lien, and violation of various state securities 
laws. (R. 2-17) . 
On July 7, 1981 defendant Grant Mills was duly served 
and a constable's return was filed with the District Court. 
(R. 22-23) . On July 29 a default certificate was entered 
by the Clerk against Grant c. Mills for failing to answer the 
Complaint. (R. 38). Concurrently, a hearing was held before 
the District Court at which time a judgment was entered 
against the defendant Grant C. Mills in the amount of $63,266 
together with attorneys' fees of $5,000, and costs of the 
action. (R. 39). The District Court executed an order 
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stating there was no just reason for delay in the entry of 
final judgment. (R. 36). 
On December 4, 1981 Grant C. Mills filed a motion to 
set aside the default. (R. 53-54). At this time affidavits 
of Mr. Mills, Annette VomDorp and Ron Stenger were also 
filed. (R. 56-64). 
Subsequently, on December 9, 1981 affidavits were filed 
on behalf of Plaintiffs by Plaintiffs' attorneys David Hardy 
and Earl Tanner and by plaintiff David Russell. (R. 42-48). 
A hearing was held by the District Court on December 10, 
1981 and the motion to set aside was denied. It is from this 
order that the present appeal is taken. (R. 78). 
The Affidavits filed by .both parties describe a series 
of events which occurred in the litigation and which were 
considered by the lower court in the motion to set aside the 
default judgment. The chronological sequence of events as 
described in these affidavits are as follows: 
Appellant Grant C. Mills was served with a Summons and 
Complaint on July 7, 1981. (Mills Affidavit, R. 56). Mills 
then contacted Ronald Stenger, an attorney in Provo, Utah 
who instructed him to forward a copy of the Summons and 
Complaint to his office so that the same could be reviewed 
for preparation of an Answer to the Complaint. (Mills 
Affidavit, R. 56). Mills· stated that he forwarded a copy 
of the Summons and Complaint to Stenger by mail. (Mills 
-3-
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Affidavit, R. 57) . 
The attorney, Ronald Stenger, in his affidavit agreed 
that he had been contacted by Mills and that he had told him 
to send him a copy of the Summons and Complaint. Stenger 
sta.ted he did not recall receiving the Summons. and Complaint 
but that "circumstances in Affiant's office at the time might 
have contributed to confusion regarding the necessity of 
response to said Complaint." (Stenger Affidavit, R. 62). 
Stenger stated that the confusion may have resulted because 
Stenger was representing other defendants in the same lawsuit. 
"At any rate Affiant's office failed to file an Answer on 
Mr. Mill's behalf." (Stenger Affidavit, R. 36). Stenger 
stated he did not inform Mills that an Answer had not been 
filed on his behalf. (Stenger Affidavit, R. 63). 
Stenger claimed to have had a conversation with Plaintiff's 
attorney, Earl Tanner, who indicated that Plaintiffs' primary 
interest was in obtaining a judgment against the corporate 
defendants and that he was less concerned with obtaining 
judgment against the individual defendants. (Stenger Affidavit, 
R. 63) . This conve~sation was denied in an affidavit filed 
by Mr. Tanner. (Tanner Affidavit, R. 45). This dispute, 
however, is immaterial to this appeal. 
The plaintiff David Russell declared in his affidavit 
that on or about July 15, 1981 he had a conversation with 
defendant Grant C. Mills at which time Mills informed Russell 
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that Mills intended to take no action on the Summons and 
Complaint filed by Russell. (Russell Affidavit, R. 47). 
This is not contradicted by Mills and must, therefore, be 
taken as true. 
Tanner stated in his affidavit that on August 10, 1981 
in a conversation with attorney Stenger the latter advised 
him that he would represent only defendants Robert L. Moody, 
Thomas S. Taylor, Gene Thurman, Merrill G. Moody, G. David 
McKell, and James C. Hill. Tanner agreed not to enter a 
money judgment against these clients if Stenger would consent 
to a judgment clearing them from the title, which was done. 
(Tanner Affidavit, R. 45) . 
An associate of Mr. Tanner also filed an affidavit. 
David Hardy stated in his affidavit that on August 18, 1981 
he received a telephone call from defendant Grant c. Mills 
and that during the course of the conversation Hardy specif i-
cally reminded Mills that a default judgment had been taken 
against him to which defendant Mills replied that he did not 
feel "he was legally obligated to the plaintiffs and there-
fore did not feel motivated by the lawsuit filed against him 
by Plaintiffs to address Plaintiffs' claims." (Hardy Affi-
davit, R. 42). This statement, also, was not denied by Mills. 
Appellant Mills in his affidavit stated that he was not 
informed by Mr. Stenger that he had not undertaken the defense 
and had assumed that an Answer had been filed on his behalf·. 
-5-
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He stated that he initiated steps to determine that his 
defense had in fact been undertaken by Stenger and that no 
judgment had been entered against him by instructing his 
employee Annette Vern Dorp to contact the Salt Lake County 
Clerk to inquire whether or not a judgment had been entered 
against him. (Mills Affidavit, R. 57). 
Annette Vern Dorp in her affidavit stated that on 
September 4, 1981 she contacted the Salt Lake County Clerk's 
office and was told that no judgment had been entered against 
Mills but that judgment had been entered against other 
defendants. (Vern Dorp Affidavit, R. 60). 
Mills then stated· that he relied upon the representations 
of the Salt Lake County Clerk and assumed that Stenger had 
undertaken his defense. Mills makes no claim that he ever 
directly asked Stenger if an Answer had been filed or 
whether he was in default. Mills stated further that he 
first learned that a judgment had been entered against him 
when he received a copy of the Writ of Execution issued by 
the Third District Court on November 24, 1981. (Mills Affi-
davit, R. 57). 
He then stated that he made a second inquiry to the 
Salt Lake County Clerk's office on November 25, 1981 and 
was again informed that no judgment had been entered against 
him. He instructed his new attorney, Jeffrey L. Silvestrini 
to investigate the matter and learned that a judgment had 
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indeed been entered on July 29, 1981. 
R. 5 7) • 
(Mills Affidavit, 
Defendant Mills in his affidavit claimed that the 
judgment itself was incorrect in that interest had not 
been computed in determining the final amount of judgment. 
He stated in his affidavit that in a conversation with Mr. 
Tanner, Tanner admitted that the amount may be wrong but 
would not correct the amount of the judgment since the extra 
amount would be used to compensate the plaintiffs for money 
which they were required to pay for counsel. (Mills Affidavit, 
R. 58-59). This statement was denied by Mr. Tanner. 
Affidavit, R. 45) . 
(Tanner 
The remaining portions of the Affidavits filed recited 
conclusions drawn by the various affiants as to the effects 
of the default. For example, attorney Stenger stated that 
he believed it would be unjust for the default judgment to 
stand due to the fact that Mr. Mills ~cted in good faith 
in contacting him and in forwarding the Sununons and Complaint 
to his office. In his opinion Mills had a good defense to 
Plaintiffsl claim. Further, he stated that there would be 
no prejudice by allowing the default to be set aside since 
other actions against the remaining defendants were still 
pending. (Stenger Affidavit, R. 63-64) . 
Likewise, Mills stated, in his opinion, he had valid 
defenses to the action ·and that it would be unjust to allow 
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the judgment to stand since he had in good faith tendered 
the defense to his licensed attorney and felt that the matter 
had been answered by Stenger based upon his inquiries with 
the Clerk's office. (Mills Affidavit, R. 58). He felt 
that to allow the judgment to stand would work an injustice 
upon him. (Id.) 
Finally, attorney Tanner stated that Plaintiffs would 
be greatly prejudiced by the. setting aside of the default 
since Mills had sold securities of approximately $2 million 
similar to those involved in the instant case and therefore 
many persons may have a cause of action against defendants 
which would prejudice the plaintiffs in collection of the 
judgment if it were set aside. (Tanner Affidavit, R. 45). 
The lower court reviewed these affidavits together with 
legal memoranda submitted by both parties and denied the 
motion to set aside the judgment. (R. 72). An order to 
stay the execution of the Mills property was entered by 
the lower court on December 15, 1981. (R. 74). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
Appellant in his brief states what he believes to be 
the applicable standard of review in an appeal based upon 
a failure to set aside a default judgment. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 4-5). Respondents believe that a clearer statement 
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of this standard was recited in this Court's opinion of 
Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855, 856 (Utah 1979). This Court 
stated the following rules applicable to these types of 
cases: 
While we agree that trial courts should 
be generally indulgent toward permitting full 
inquiry and knowledge of disputes so they can 
be settled advisedly and in conformity with 
law and justice, . . . each case must neverthe-
less depend upon its own peculiar facts and 
circumstances. "No general rule can be laid 
down respecting the discretion to be exercised· 
in setting aside or refusing to set aside a 
judgment by default. . . but the discretion 
should always be so exercised as to promote the 
ends of justice .... " (Citations omitted). 
Appellant and Respondents both agree that the decision of 
whether to set aside a default judgment is a discretionary 
matter. This Court recognized that the lower court dis-
cretion would only be reversed "if it is clear the court 
abused that discretion." 
This Court in Heath then quoted with approval the lan-
guage contained in Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 
P.2d 429 (Utah 1973), where the balancing of interests is 
explained together with the concept that the balancing 
initially is left to the lower court. That decision stated: 
The trial court must balance two valid 
considerations; on the one hand, to relieve 
the party of the judgment vitiates the effect 
of res judicata and it creates a hardship for 
the successful litigant by causing him to 
prosecute more than once his action and 
subjecting him to possible loss of collecting 
his judgment. On the other hand, the court 
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desires to protect the losing party who has not 
had the opportunity to present his claim or 
defense. The rule that the courts will incline 
towards granting relief to a party, who has not 
had the opportunity to present his case, is 
ordinarily applied at the trial court level, and 
this court will not reverse the determination 
of the trial court merely because the motion 
could have been granted. 597 P.2d at 858. 
Appellant suggests several questions to be determined 
on the appeal based upon the standard of appellate review. 
Respondents, however, disagree that these are the relevant 
questions to be determined on appeal. Rather, Respondents 
submit that this Court should direct its attention solely 
to these questions: 
(1) Did the appellant make timely application to 
have the judgment set aside? 
(2) Did the lower court abuse its discretion in finding 
that Appellant's conduct did not justify vacation of the 
judgment? 
A. The Lower Court Properly Denied Appellant's Motion 
to Set Aside the Judgment Since Such Motion was Not Timely 
Made. 
Appellant states in his brief that the circumstances of 
this case "obviously do not fall within subparagraph (2), (3), 
(4) or (6) of Rule 60(b) and while it is less obvious, they 
do not fall within subparagraph (1) either." Appellant then 
states: 
Mills' actions do not constitute mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or neglect. Rather, 
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he did everything reasonably expected of him 
and perhaps more. But despite his diligence, 
he has not had an opportunity to present his 
case, through no fault of his own. That 
certainly constitutes "any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment" within subparagraph (7) of Rule 60(b). 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-8). 
Thus, Appellant attempts to argue that his grounds for 
relief are pursuant to subparagraph (7) of Rule 60(b) and 
not subparagraph (1). The obvious reason for this argu-
ment is simply ·the fact that paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 
require a party to move for vacation of the default judgment 
within three (3) months after the judgment was taken. There 
is no such time limitation as to subdivision (7). 
Thus, before it can be determined whether Appellant 
timely filed to set aside the default judgment it must first 
be determined whether his asserted grounds for relief comes 
under subdivision (1) or subdivision (7). Respondents sub-
mit that without question, and in spite of Appellants' 
attempt to the contrary, any excuse which Appellant can now 
as~ert would have come within the me~ning of subsection (1) 
in that the conduct would have been constituted, at most, 
as "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect." 
Viewing the allegations of Appellant most favorably to 
him reveals that the main thrust of his claim to set aside 
the judgment was simply that he relied upon Mr. Sten~er to 
file an Answer on his behalf but that Mr. Stenger did not do 
-11-
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so. However, there are really two subparts to this assertion. 
First, what effect does the conduct of Appellant's attorney 
have upon the setting aside of a default judgment? Second, 
did Appellant's own actions, independent of his attorney's, 
justify relief from judgment. 
If it is assumed that Mr. Stenger forgot to file an 
Answer on behalf of Appellant (even though Stenger never 
admits to having received the Summons and Complaint) the 
conduct of Appellant's attorney (even assuming that there was 
an attorney-client relationship) would clearly come under 
subdivision (1) of Rule 60(b). 
In Cockerham v. Zikratch, 619 P.2d 739 {Ariz. 1980) the 
Supreme Court of Arizona dealt with the identical question 
as to whether the alleged neglect of a party's attorney con-
stituted a subdivision (1) or subdivision (7) claim. [It 
should be noted that Utah's Rule 60(b) is contained as 60(c) 
in the Arizona code and that sub~ection (7) is subsection (6) 
in the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.] The Arizona Supreme 
Court stated the following: 
Defendants also claim that the default judgment 
should have been set aside due to gross neglect of 
their counsel under Rule 60(c) (6): "[A]ny other 
reason justifying relie·f from the operation of the 
judgment" .... Under Rule 60(c) the neglect of 
their attorney is attributed to defendants "and 
only when the attorney's omission or failure to act 
is legally excusable may relief be obtained." 
Treadaway v. Meador, 103 Ariz. 83, 84, 436 P.2d 
902, 903 (1968). Defendants' contention that after 
the time has expired for making a motion for relief 
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from a judgment for excusable neglect under Rule 
60{c) (1), a motion may still be made under Rule 
60{c) (6) for relief from a j.udgrnent due to gross 
neglect, or neglect which is not excusable, is 
illogical. We hold that motions for relief from 
final judgm~-nts based upon neglect must be filed 
under Rule 60(c) (1), not Rule 60(c) (6). Accord., 
Clamprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 {1949). 
619 P.2d at 744. 
In Tahoe Village Realty v. Desmet, 590 P.2d Ll58 (Nev. 
1979) the defendants asserted that they believed their attorney 
had filed a responsive document to plaintiff's complaint and 
therefore the failure of the attorney was excusable neglect. 
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court was not 
bound to declare the conduct of appellants' attorney as 
"excusable" pursuant to Section 60(b) (1) of the Nevada Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Likewise, any conduct of appellant himself would also 
fall under the subsect~on (1) category. It should be observed 
that Appellant never states in his affidavit that he contacted 
Stenger in order to determine whether Stenger had received 
the Summons and Complaint mailed or whether an Answer had 
been filed. Rather, he contacted the Salt Lake County Clerk's 
office in September, nearly two months after he had been 
served, to determine whether the case had yet gone to judgment. 
Had the appellant made proper inquiry from the person he 
claimed to be his own attorney, he would have discovered the 
"mistake" in failing to file an Answer within the three-month 
statutory period. It is clear that both the conduct of Stenger 
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and the conduct of Appellant, based upon their own affi-
davits, must be classified under subsection (1) of Rule 
60 (b) . 
This Court in Pitts v. McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 
1977) rejected a s.imilar attempt of a party to urge $Ubsection 
(7) rather than (1) when the time for objecting had expired. 
This Court stated the following: 
It seems ~nescapable, also, to conclude that 
Rule 60 (b) (1) . is .applicable here in the letter and 
spirit of rules governing procedure and practice 
and the doctrine of the exercise of diligence in 
the presentation of ones rights, failing which 
they are amenable to a limitation statutory feature 
looking to repose of litigation after a reasonable 
time, inter.dieted here to be three months under 
Rule 6 0 ( b) ( 1 ) . 
. . 
See also, Robinson v. Myers, 599 P~2d 513 (Utah-1979); J.P. w. 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 (Utah 1979) where this 
Court rejected other attempts to use subdivision (7} in place 
of subdivision (1) . 
Thus, it can be assuemd without much doubt that the 
three-month statutory time period for setting aside a default 
as provided in Rule 60 (b} (1) was applicable to this case .. 
The default was taken on July 29, 1981. The motion to set 
aside the default was filed on December 4, 1981 which was 
clearly beyond the three-month time period, and the affidavits 
of Appellants themselves clearly show that either Appellant 
or his counsel neglected to pay timely attention to the case. 
Appellant seems to argue that even if it is assumed that 
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the three-month period is applicable that Appellant is still 
,,.. 
timely. Appellant submits that "reasons suggest-that the 
three-month limitation would not begin to run until the 
judgment debtor has notice of the entry of the judgment. 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 9). Appellant asserts that it was 
the obligation of Respondents to notify him of the default 
and that until such notification was made the three-month time 
period did not begin to run. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10). 
This argument is completely void of merit. There was 
no obligation on the part of Respondents to notify Appellant 
that a default judgment had been taken against him. Rule 
SS(b) U.R.C.P. specifically provides in subsection (2) the 
following: 
Notice to Party in Default. After the entry 
of the default of any party, as provided in 
Subdivision (a) (1) of this Rule, it shall not be 
necessary to give such party in default any notice 
of action taken or to be taken or to serve any 
notice or paper otherwise required by these Rules 
to be served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
. . . . 
Since Respondents were not obligated to inform Appellant of 
the default judgment, even if Appellant claims that notifi-
cation did not occur until after the three-month time period 
had elapsed were true, it would be immaterial. However, 
this is not true. 
The undisputed affidavit of Plaintiffs' attorney reveals 
that on August 18, 1981 he told Appellant that a default 
judgment had been taken against him but that Appellant replied 
-15-
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he did not believe he was legally obligated to respond 
and therefore was not going to do anything. (R. 42-43). 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure puts the burden on 
Appellant-to monitor the litigation after he has been seJ;"ved 
with notice that the lawsuit has been commenced against him. 
The cases relied upon by Appellant to support his con-
tention are inappropriate. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-11). 
In Bish's Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 359 P.2d 21 (Utah 1961) 
the court held that if a showing were made that the district 
court had reversed the decision of the city court on an appeal 
without due notice of such~appeal or the p~oceedings in the 
district court, that the prevailing party in the city court 
could establish lack of due process of law and would be 
entitled to relief from judgment of the district court. The 
instant case, of course, does not involve an appeal or lack 
of notice of the appeal. 
In Central Finance Co. v. Kynaston, 452 P.2d 316 (Utah 
1969) the court remanded that case to the lower court to 
determine whether the· district court clerk had failed to 
notify the defendant's attorney of the time of trial in vio-
lation of a specific court rule of that district. This Court 
observed that in the absence of a specific rule of court, 
attorneys are not entitled to rely upon clerks of courts to 
give them notice of trial settings. Again, the instant 
case does not involve the failure of the parties to attend 
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a trial and, in fact, Rule 54(b) (2) specifically states 
that no notice is required as to defaults. 
Finally, in Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Egla Develop-
ment, 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980) a similar question as to 
notification of a trial date was presented after the def en-
dant claimed that his attorney had withdrawn and that he 
never received notice of the date from the opposing counsel 
or the court clerk. 
Obviously, these cases do not stand for the proposition 
that "notice" in a default judgment must be given to the 
defaulting party, and even if they did, actual notice was 
in fact given in the instant case. 
Thus, the lower court correctly denied Appellant's motion 
to set aside the judgment, ruling that Appellant had failed 
to file the motion within. the applicable time limit. Appellant's 
affidavits show neglect on the part of both Mills and Stenger. 
Whether the neglect was excusable or unexcusable, matters not. 
The only grounds supported by affidavit fall under subdivision 
(1) of Rule 60 and, therefore, any motion based on these excuses 
must be brought· within the three-month time period. Appellant's 
failure to do so precludes any relief. 
B. Assuming Arguendo that the Motion was Timely, the 
Lower Court Still did not Abuse its Discretion in Failing to 
Set the Judgment Aside. 
Appellant asserts, "One might ask what more Mills should 
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have done to properly defend himself in this action?" 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6). Respondents can easily answer 
this question. 
The attorney-client relationship between Appellant and 
Stenger, based upon the affidavits of both individuals, showed 
no existence of a firm arrangement whereby Stenger undertook 
to represent Mills. The fact that Stenger specifically 
filed an answer for other defendants in this case, but 
not Mills, would indicate that he was not representing Mills. 
Further, the undisputed affidavit of Tanner says that Stenger 
told him that he did not represent Mills, due to an apparent 
conflict of interest. 
There is nothing in the record to ever show that Mills 
had any more discussions with Stenger after the initial con-
versation. A reasonable person would certainly have talked 
to his attorney to see if he received the pleadings and 
accepted the case. That conduct sounds more like deliberate 
or reckless ;.disregard of judicial process than mere negligence. 
Even after three months of silence, Mills chose to call the 
Clerk's office to find out whether a judgment had been entered 
against him rather than calling Stenger to see if his interests 
had been represented. 
Respondents submit that the affidavits of Stenger and 
Mills have been written in such a manner to preclude any 
assertion that Stenger actually represented Mills or that 
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Stenger had been contacted by Mills as his client after the 
initial conversation. 
If, on the other hand, Stenger indeed failed to repre-
sent Appellant in the proceeding after agreeing to do so, 
then the action lies against Stenger and not against 
Respondents. As noted earlier, the neglect of an attorney 
is imputed to the client. Cockerham v. Zikratch, 619 P.2d 
739 (Ariz. 1980). If Stenger neglected to properly represent 
Mills then an action against Stenger should be brought. 
However, this "mistake" or "inadvertence" of Stenger cannot 
be imputed to Respondents. In Jennings v. Stoker, No. 17634 
(Utah, July 28, 1982) this Court held that the alleged mal-
practice of a plaintiff's attorney does not justify the 
granting of a new trial as against the opposing party. This 
same principle is applicable here. Appellant's sole remedy 
at this point in time is against Stenger, not Plaintiffs. 
Thus, either Appellant's purported attorney Stenger or 
Appellant himself was negligent in failing to respond to 
the Complaint properly served by Plaintiffs. Even if it 
were assumed that the lower court had the power to consider 
the question of Appellant's negligence, it cannot be said 
under the affidavits here present that the lower court 
abused its discretion in concluding that the neglect or 
mistake shown was not "excusable". 
For this reason, also, therefore, the decision of the 
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lower court must be sustained. 
POINT II 
THE JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE IS PROPER AND 
WAS TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 55(b) (2). 
Appellant next argues that even if the default should 
not have been set aside, the judgment itself is void since 
the lower court failed to take evidence on the issues 
presented to the court. (Appellant's Brief, PPG 12-15). 
Appellant lists eleven items upon which the lower court 
supposedly should have taken evidence before rendering the 
default judgment. 
Again, this argument is not supported by any legal 
theory. Rule 55(b) (2) provides, as stated by Appellant, 
that in cases where it is necessary to determine the amount 
of damages or to establish the truth of any averment, the 
court may conduct hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessary and proper. 
A review of the Complaint· filed in this action clearly 
shows that the amount of damages sought were clear and subject 
to mathematical calculation. (R. 2-10). Because of this, 
had Respondents desired they could have gone to the Clerk 
alone for a judgment on the fixed sum of the Complaint. [Rule 
55(b) (l)]. However, Respondents went before a district court 
judge to obtain their judgment and to rrake a proper showing on 
attorneys' fees. 
At the hearing it was necessary to produce evidence as 
-20-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to attorneys' fees. The court will note that the order for 
final judgment specifically states "that testimony had been 
taken" and thereafter granted an award of attorneys' fees of 
$5,000 in addition to the money judgment prayed for in the 
Complaint. (R. 36). 
The question of attorneys' fees was the only matter 
which required the taking of evidence. All other items 
listed by Appellant were conceded when Appellant failed to 
answer the Complaint. It is not necessary for a court to 
take evidence as to the merits of the case since to do so 
would require a trial on ·a default judgment. The only require-
ment of an evidentiary hearing concerns unliqu.idated damages 
such as claims of general dal}lages or punitive damages in which 
the amounts cannot be ascertained from the pleadings themselves. 
Pitts v. Pine Meadows Ranch, Inc., 589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978). 
For example, whether Mills was in fact a licensed 
securities agent, whether the note constituted a security, 
whether any representations were made to the Russells by 
Mills, whether the representations were true or false, etc. 
are all questions which were conceded when Appellant failed 
to answer the Complaint. 
Likewise, if the Complaint stated an incorrect amount 
as to the amount owing on the note and failed to take into 
account alleged payments which had been made, this too was 
waived by Appellant when he failed to answer. It must be 
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assumed that the amount stated in the Complaint is conceded 
to by the party in default or otherwise even amounts which 
are stated as a sum certain would require evidence contrary 
to Rule 55 (b) . 
The only amount claimed in the Complaint requiring 
evidence was attorneys' fees. The record shows that a hearing 
was held and evidence was taken. as to the reasonableness of 
attorneys' fees. The language of a judgment is deemed to be 
correct in the absence of contrary evidence. Hutcheson v. 
Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 (Utah 1981). The Appellant has failed 
to produce any evidence disputing the reasonableness of the 
attorneys' fees or evidence showing that an evidentiary 
hearing was.not in fact held. It is the burden of the 
appellant to support his allegations with evidence or at 
least with a record of the lower court proceedings. Garrand 
v. Garrand, 615 P.2d 422 (Utah 1980). It must therefore be 
assumed that the lower court conducted a proper hearing and 
concluded that $5,000 was in fact a reasonable attorneys' 
fee based upon the numerous circumstances in the litigation. 
In any event, even if the lower court improperly failed 
to take evidence as to the amount of damages the remedy is 
to remand for a further evidentiary hearing not to vacate 
the judgment. Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., 589 P.2d 767 
(Utah 1978); J. P. W. Enterprises, Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 
486 (Utah 1979). 
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The plaintiffs in this case properly followed the pro-
cedure for obtaining a default judgment based upon an 
ascertained sum. A hearing in fact was held as to 
attorneys' fees and there exists in the present record no 
evidence that the court falsely stated it had taken evidence, 
or that the amount awarded is not reasonable. The~efore, 
Appellants' claim that Rule SS(b) was not followed is without 
merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The rules providing for defaults were formulated to 
provide an expedient. method of obtaining judgment when no 
contest of issues is present. The rules developed to relieve 
a party of judgment were likewise engineered· to prevent 
injustice to a defaulting party while, at the same time, 
providing safeguards to the party taking the default. 
Here, the affidavits filed by Appellant establish a 
course of conduct that did not allow relief from the default 
judgment entered against him. His supposed reliance upon 
his attorney to answer the allegations does not allow him 
relief as against Plaintiffs--his relief is against his 
attorney. 
Similarly, his own conduct showed a reckless indifference 
to the judicial process by his failure to consult with his 
attorney or to take any steps to ascertain that his interests 
were being protected. The uncontroverted affidavits show 
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that Appellant did not believe he was liable to Plaintiffs 
and therefore was going to do nothing about the lawsuit in 
spite of war~ings from Plaintiffs and their attorneys. 
In any event, however, the application for "excusable" 
conduct was not timely made and this reason alone disposes 
of any substantive arguments as to the actions of Appellant. 
Under Rule 60(b} (1) the application for relief must be made 
within three months of judgment--here, it was not. 
Finally, the judgment itself was valid since the lower 
court properly entered judgment for a fixed sum as plead in 
Plaintiffs' Complaint and took evidence as to attorneys' fees. 
Neither the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure nor simple logic 
dictat·e that a full evidentiary trial must be held -for each 
default judgment. 
The decision o.f the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~I ~Tanner, Sr. 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondents 
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